The definition of the irrationality ground of judicial review recognises the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in allowing for judicial control of the executive only very rarely. The author in a previous article in this study found that the courts, on occasions, had intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions arguably were not irrational. To this end, the purpose of this article is to assess the constitutionality of these seemingly low standards of irrationality. The author does so by reference either to the manner of review employed -the use of the proportionality principle, for example -or the context of the administrative decision under scrutiny, such as the infringement of the applicant's fundamental rights. The author finds that the cases from the previous article where low standards of irrationality were arguably adopted were, in fact, legitimate according to these chosen methods of evaluation. However, this is an interim conclusion because, for reasons of word length, the author is unable to complete a full assessment here. It is therefore proposed that a subsequent article will continue to examine the constitutionality of these cases. Furthermore, the author will also try and establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are excluded from irrationality review. If the author is unsuccessful in this regard, the final conclusion of this study will inevitably be that low standards of judicial intervention exist without limit -a clear assault on the constitutional principle stated above.
Introduction
Orthodox theories of administrative law prescribe that judicial review is concerned with examining only the legality of executive power rather than its merits.
1 For example, Lord Irvine, a previous Lord Chancellor, has identified at least three justifications for this principle. First, 'a constitutional imperative': public authorities should exercise discretionary powers that have been entrusted to them by Parliament.
Every authority has within its influence a level of knowledge and experience which justifies the decision of Parliament to entrust that authority with decision-making power. Second, 'lack of judicial expertise': it follows that the courts are ill-equipped to take decisions in place of the designated authority. Third, 'the democratic imperative': it has long been recognised that elected public authorities, and particularly local authorities, derive their authority in part from their electoral mandate. 2 These imperatives of judicial restraint owe much, therefore, to the constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the organs of the state.
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Though this principle has never been strictly enforced in the UK, 4 the tenets of such a philosophy arguably still hold true. 5 Indeed, this principle has been strengthened in recent years with the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), incorporating certain Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 6 such as Article 6, the right to a fair trial by an independent and unbiased 4 about the courts holding the state ever more to account at the expense of political scrutiny -the author is naturally inclined to view his earlier finding about the judicial review of the merits of administrative action as something sinister. Perhaps a usurpation by the unelected judiciary of the power of the executive? Or is it something more benign? A matter of evolution, a natural repositioning of the courts within the normal jockeying for power that exists amongst the institutions of the state? Or is it something more systematic? A legitimate shift in the balance of power between the courts and government? The purpose of this article is to address some of these questions.
The author therefore intends to reassess here the classic limits of judicial review, reflecting the possible constitutional elevation of the courts which he found in the previous article. He proposes to do this by examining the possible motives for judicial intervention in some of these merits-review cases from the earlier piece with a view to questioning whether the low standards of irrationality employed were in fact within constitutional norms. To this end, much of this article considers the legitimacy of the manner in which the courts conducted merits-review. That is, the author questions whether some of the judges in these earlier cases actually employed a different test of review to irrationality -proportionality, for example -which may affect the conclusion one draws about their constitutionality. The remainder of this article considers the legitimacy of some of these merits-review cases by reference to the context of the administrative decision under examination; this is with particular reference to the HRA which has now made the applicability of irrationality to rights' cases possibly redundant. 14 For reasons of space the author is unable to complete an evaluation of the HRA's impact on the constitutionality of employing low standards of irrationality so is forced to leave some discussion of this issue for a later article. Suffice it to say, however, this does not prevent him from drawing some important, preliminary conclusions here that the cases of merits-review identified in the previous piece were arguably legitimate.
The Judicial Review of Merits
14 See Hilson (2003, p.142) .
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In the first article, it was stated above, the author examined several cases where the courts ruled that the administrative decision-makers in question had acted contrary to the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness/irrationality, questioning whether the case facts justified the judges in holding the decisions to be unlawful. 15 If not, this had caused the courts to review the merits of the executive activity under consideration. For the purposes of this article it will be necessary to revisit the low standards of irrationality employed by the courts in two of these cases: Regina v.
Coventry City Council, Ex parte Phoenix Aviation 16 and Regina v. Cambridge District
Health Authority, Ex parte B 17 in the Divisional Court.
In Ex parte Phoenix Aviation Simon Brown LJ (as he then was) held that Coventry City
Council had acted unlawfully in restricting the flights of live animals from Coventry Airport, after breaches of airport security by public demonstrators opposed to the exports. The judge said: "The council's resolution was wholly disproportionate to the security risk presented at the time." 18 Here, Mr Brewer, the Assistant Chief Constable of Warwickshire Police, was worried about the penetration of the airport's perimeter fence by demonstrators so wrote to the airport manager, expressing his concerns should the flights resume. He urged the manager to undertake a comprehensive review of security (since the police did not have a responsibility to protect the airport from trespass). In following the police's advice, the airport authorities and the council explored the option of improving the strength of the airport's perimeter fence. Because of the likely time to complete the work (2-3 months), and its estimated cost (£400,000), the next best course of action to prevent the incursion by the demonstrators, it seems to the author, was to cease the live animal exports. Is it right, therefore, to categorise this eventual decision by the airport authorities and the council as irrational in a public law sense? Was this not a 6 reasonable option addressing the unease which the police had expressed? If so, it is contended that this was an engagement by Simon Brown LJ in the merits of the council's decision as the judge adopted a low standard of irrationality.
In Ex parte B the decision of the Cambridge District Health Authority not to fund further medical treatment for a girl, B, aged ten with cancer was under scrutiny, Laws J (as he then was) ruling this was irrational. Again, was this an administrative decision that was unlawful in a public law sense? The author argues that it was not. First, the cancer treatment the applicant required had a success rate of only between 10 and 20%, it was at variance with the majority of medical opinion and was experimental rather than standard therapy. Secondly, arguably, the judge attached too little weight to the opinions of the doctors who had treated the girl for much of her life: they did not believe in subjecting her to further suffering and trauma when the prospects of success were so slight, and carried a high risk of early morbidity. Thirdly, B had already undergone a course of total body irradiation which, according to accepted medical opinion, was therapy which no one should undergo more than once. Finally, substantial expenditure on treatment with such a small prospect of success was not an effective use of financial resources. With a limited budget, the authority, it is fair to say, had a responsibility to ensure that sufficient funds were available for the care of other patients.
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Ex parte Phoenix Aviation and Ex parte B are just two examples taken from a larger sample of merits-review cases identified by the author in the first article of this study.
But were these low standards of intervention in fact illegitimate? The purpose of this article is to address this question.
The Manner of Merits-Review
In examining the constitutionality of the low standards of irrationality identified in the previous article, the author here considers the legitimacy of the manner in which the courts maybe conducted merits-review. The proportionality principle therefore possesses a "principled template of relevant questions". 30 That is, once a reviewing court has been convinced by the legitimacy of the aim identified by the state, such as national security or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and there was a reasonable nexus between the means to achieve the aim -the infringement of the right -and the aim itself, it must then consider whether there was a pressing social need for infringing the right. In asking itself the latter question the reviewing court is determining whether the means are proportionate to the aim being pursued. Jowell (1996) and (2000) and Lester (1987) and (1988) . 38 Ibid (1987) and (1988) and Lester (2001a) . Lord Lester gives a useful explanation of the adoption of the proportionality test in other jurisdictions in Lester (2001b) . 39 Wong (2000) . 40 Elliott (2001). 41 Fordham (2002) . 42 Hickman (2007) . 43 Fordham (2002, p.110) . 44 De Burca (1997, p.574) . 45 [2003] 2 AC 295. 46 On this point Lord Slynn was, arguably, in a minority. Lord Nolan, for example, indicated there was no need to extend the grounds of review which he regarded as broad and generous (ibid., para 62). Lord Clyde said that it might well be difficult to achieve a sufficient enlargement to meet the stated purpose without jeopardising the constitutional balance between the role of the courts and the role of the executive (ibid., para 169). This section has begun to assess the constitutionality of some of the merits-review cases the author identified in the previous article of this study. In particular, although the cases were examples where the courts seemingly employed the irrationality test, they were arguably ones in which a form or variation of proportionality review was exercised. Many academic and judicial commentators support the more general adoption of the proportionality test in conventional judicial review. Whether the principle ought to replace the irrationality test or be an addition to it is largely irrelevant to the purpose of this article. What is relevant, however, is establishing the legitimacy of these merits-review cases found previously. The author here has identified the ruling of Simon Brown LJ in Ex parte Phoenix Aviation as an example where proportionality was maybe employed in all but name. This section therefore concludes that this review of merits was arguably constitutionally justified because of the nature of review exercised. The next section of this article continues the theme of this one: it considers the legitimacy of these merits-review cases where the manner in employing low standards of irrationality was the possible adoption of another method of judicial review, the "hard look" test.
51 See Craig (2001, p.592 (Fordham 2007, p.267) : "The Law Lords, failing to take the hint, put the development of the common law back a decade." He does predict that common law proportionality will eventually become a free standing head of challenge, notwithstanding the House of Lords rejecting the appeal -see Fordham (2008, p.67) .
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ii) The application of "hard look" In essence, the objective with this test is to ensure that policy alternatives are adequately considered, that reasons are proffered for agency decisions, and that differing interests can present their views to the agency and have those views adequately discussed.
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"Hard look" therefore engages a court more in reviewing the manner in which an administrative decision was reached. For example, it not only decides matters that are relevant to the exercise of a discretion, but also the weight to be attached to them. This is clearly not the same as the UK courts' application of the Wednesbury principle:
irrationality review is concerned only with the outcome of an administrative decision and 54 James and Longley (1995, p.371) . 55 463 US 29 (1983) . 56 Craig (1994, p.438 Sedley (1997, p.9) . 60 Harden and Lewis (1986, p.205) . 61 James and Longley (1995, pp.372-373) . 62 Harden and Lewis (1986, pp.272-275 Convention rights in domestic courts. 80 The HRA incorporated some of the Articles of the ECHR 81 into domestic law principally through s.3: "So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights." In interpreting primary and secondary legislation, the courts, according to s.2, must take into account the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). If a court cannot interpret a statute "so far as it is possible to do so", s.4(2) provides: "If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of incompatibility." A declaration of incompatibility is not an order invalidating an Act of Parliament on the basis that it infringes a Convention right. Amending offending primary legislation to make it Convention compatible is the preserve of the executive 79 Procedurally, there are different rules for conventional judicial review and judicial review under the HRA. This means that, notwithstanding the coming into force of the HRA, infringements of fundamental rights may still have to be pursued through the traditional Wednesbury irrationality test. See, for example, Miles (2000) and Squires (2000) . 80 The HRA has come in for much criticism, most notably for 'inhibiting' the state's ability to fight terrorism -see, for example, Morton (2006) , and more generally Dennis (2006) and Clayton (2007 Hickman (2004) . 85 Article 2 of the ECHR, the right to life, says: "(1) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. (2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection." However, in McCann v. United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97 the ECtHR said (para 149): "[The] the use of the term "absolutely necessary" in Article 2(2) indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when determining whether State action is "necessary in a democratic society" under paragraph 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2(a), (b) and (c) of Article 2." This, therefore, recognises proportionality, albeit less intensively, in Article 2 of the ECHR.
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The case of Daly was referred to earlier in this article because of the House of Lords'
general support for proportionality in domestic law. It is examined again here because the judges also required its application to breaches of qualified rights under the HRA. In
Daly the court, it will be recalled, held that the blanket policy of the Secretary of Stateobliging prisoners to be absent during cell searches whenever their privileged legal correspondence was examined but not read -was unlawful. The court found, inter alia, that the policy amounted to a disproportionate interference with the applicant's right to respect for his correspondence under Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Lord
Bingham said: "The infringement of prisoners' rights to maintain the confidentiality of their privileged legal correspondence is greater than is shown to be necessary to serve the legitimate public objectives already identified." which however irritating to the police was entirely lawful) to view the claimant as other than a committed, peaceful demonstrator. It was wholly disproportionate to restrict her exercise of her rights under Article 10 and 11 because she was in the company of others some of whom might, at some time in the future, breach the peace." The UK courts now employ the proportionality principle since the coming into force of the HRA. Clearly, therefore, a review of merits is justified where infringements of qualified rights of the ECHR are alleged. In this regard, some of the reviews of merits Jowell and Lester (1988) suggest that Wheeler was a case where the proportionality test was maybe employed. They say (p.61): "Lord Templeman considered [the council's decision] to be a misuse of power, "punishing the club where it had done no wrong". Lord Roskill considered the withdrawal of a licence to be an unfair means of pursuing the council's ends. Both speeches reflect the notion of proportionality, Lord Templeman concentrating on the lack of relation between the penalty and the wrong, Lord Roskill concentrating on the lack of relation between the penalty and the council's legitimate objectives."
Council had acted irrationally in seeking an order for possession of land occupied by "gypsies", who were causing a public nuisance, without providing them with alternative accommodation. Was this not, therefore, a prima facie denial by the council of the travellers' rights to respect for their home life, freedom of association and peaceful enjoyment of their possessions? If so, the court would have been obliged to balance these rights with the public interest of protecting disorder and crime, applying the proportionality test.
However, the adoption of the proportionality principle does not necessarily mean a reviewing court is engaging in a review of merits. proportionality required a balancing exercise, and a decision which was justified on the basis of a compelling case in the public interest, it did not require a decision that was the least intrusive of Convention rights. The "least intrusive" approach is a more intensive method of review than proportionality and adopted by courts in the US, for example. 93 In this respect, some UK judges may not regard the proportionality test as obliging them to exercise the degree of enquiry that the author implied was maybe the case when he first discussed this principle in an earlier section of this article.
What effect, therefore, does this possible inference about proportionality have on the conclusions drawn from the previous article in this study about irrationality review affording the courts the opportunity to review merits?
Furthermore, in the international sphere the ECtHR has adopted a "margin of appreciation" reflecting the social and cultural differences which exist amongst the Despite the margin of appreciation principle being applicable in a supra-national context there may be a similar principle -either "a discretionary area of judgment", "a margin of discretion" or "judicial deference" -adopted by the UK courts when considering infringements of the ECHR in domestic law. 96 In this regard, it is unlikely that the UK courts will examine breaches of qualified rights of the ECHR with any great intensity where a balance is to be struck between private and public considerations such as public morality, and, for example, the prevention of disorder and crime and national security. 97 If so, the degree of review in these contexts 94 (1976) 96 An explanation as to why the term "margin of appreciation" is inappropriate to domestic HRA cases is given by Rivers -see Rivers (2006, p.175 The purpose here has been to reassess the constitutionality of some of these low standards of irrationality which were found in the earlier article of this study.
Considering the legitimacy of a review of merits based upon the manner of review, it has been questioned whether Simon Brown LJ in Ex parte Phoenix Aviation may have been justified in adopting a low standard of intervention because he was in fact employing the proportionality principle as a substitute for irrationality. The proportionality test has been adopted widely by the UK courts in matters of EC Law since the European Communities Act 1972 came into force in January 1973. Nevertheless, its case for greater recognition in English administrative law has been strengthened since October 2000 with the coming into force of the HRA and the incorporation of Convention rights into domestic law. In these terms it is difficult to doubt the constitutionality of a review of merits where proportionality has been adopted under the auspices of irrationality. Similarly, Laws J in
Ex parte B may have been acting legitimately as his engagement in a review of merits was possibly due to another acceptable basis for judicial intervention, the adoption of the "hard look" test. Furthermore, the context of these two cases cannot be ignored. Since fundamental rights were at issue on both occasions, again, the constitutionality of these reviews of merits is difficult to ignore. The coming into force of the HRA, and especially the obligation imposed on the courts by s. 3 to interpret primary and secondary legislation in any proceedings in line with Convention rights "so far it is possible to do so", strengthens their case for legitimacy still further.
What then are the consequences of this constitutional repositioning of the courts? Of course, public law espouses the principle of the separation of powers between the organs of the state. Those individuals who contend, for whatever reason, that a review of merits is legitimate surely do not desire a complete merger of the judicial and executive functions: there must still be a threshold where a reviewing court is not permitted to overstep?
In the subsequent article in this study the author will identify such a limit to judicial review, "substitution of judgment". He will, however, encounter problems in the practical application of this limit, some commentators, for example, having confused it with other principles like proportionality. Since this article has found proportionality review to be in fact constitutionally justifiable, there is, therefore, a worrying conclusion to be drawn from this confusion: the possible inability to classify 30 any low standards of intervention as being illegitimate (at least) by reference to the manner of review adopted.
Finding the manner of review to be therefore inappropriate as a means of identifying unacceptable grounds for judicial intervention, the author prefers in this later article to classify low standards of irrationality by reference to context. However, this, too, will pose similar problems in that constitutional justifications for intervention such as breaches of basic rights invariably overlap with unconstitutional ones such as matters of policy. In the long term, therefore, the third article in this study will highlight a fundamental inability to identify a zone of judicial intervention where the courts are excluded. If traditionalists within public law are concerned about the wider acceptance of merits-review by the courts, as identified by the author in the previous article, the lack of any acceptable limits to judicial review signals a serious constitutional shift in the balance of power between the executive and the unelected courts. Are we therefore witnessing a fusing of the judicial and executive roles? If so, for reasons of democracy, the ultimate conclusion of this three article study will be the demand for the courts to return to more orthodox standards of judicial intervention.
